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Abstract 
How is the nature of firms’ output fluctuations associated with the firms’ preferences 
between permanent (indefinite term) and temporary (definite term) labor contract? Using 
plant-level data from the Plant Capacity Utilization (PCU) survey, we explore how 
manufacturing plants’ use of temporary workers is associated with the nature of their output 
fluctuations and other plant characteristics. We find that plants tend to use temporary workers 
when their output is expected to fall; this may indicate that firms use temporary workers to 
reduce costs associated with dismissing permanent employees. In addition, we find that 
plants whose future output levels are subject to greater uncertainty tend to use more 
temporary workers. We also examine the effects of wage and benefit levels for permanent 
workers, unionization rates, turnover rates, seasonal factors, and plant size and age on the use 
of temporary workers; based on our results, we discuss various views of why firms use 
temporary workers.  
Key words: temporary workers, output fluctuations 
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The temporary help industry (THS) has grown rapidly over the last quarter century. The 
industry’s rapid growth has attracted substantial attention from researchers (ex. Autor (2003), 
Erickcek, Houseman, and Kelleberg (2002), Golden (1996), Houseman (2001), Polivka 
(1996), and Segal and Sullivan (1995, 1997)) who, along with industry analysts, have 
identified a number of reasons why temporary workers may be attractive to client firms 
beyond their traditional role of filling in when permanent employees are absent for short 
periods.    
In this paper, we investigate to what extent temporary workers are used by firms to 
accommodate fluctuations in production level. While various papers (Houseman (2001), 
Segal and Sullivan (1995, 1997), Golden (1996), Autor (2003)) seem to view this role as one 
of primary reasons why firms use temporary workers, few papers examine how a firm’s use 
of these workers is associated with the nature of its output fluctuation.
2 
As many papers (ex. Hamermesh (1989), Bentolila and Bertola (1990), 
Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (1999), and Campbell and Fisher (2004)) have 
considered, adjusting the level of permanent employees can involve hiring and firing costs. 
This contrasts with adjusting the level of temporary workers; a firm can reduce the number of 
temporary workers when the short-term contract ends without additional costs, and less 
training is typically required for the type of jobs filled by temporary workers. The use of 
temporary workers may, however, incur higher unit costs of labor; because the short-term 
contracts impose more job insecurities (Houseman and Polivka, 2000), and, given the skill of 
                                                           
2  Houseman (2001) surveyed firms about their use of temporary workers and found that a substantial 
fraction of firms reported meeting fluctuations in demand as a reason.  Campbell and Fisher (2004) 
developed a theoretical model describing a firm’s decision to adjust employment of two groups of workers 
with some of the characteristics of temporary and permanent workers and compare their calibration with 
aggregate level data. However, there are no empirical studies that examine the relationship between a 
firm’s use of temporary workers and its own output fluctuations.  
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a worker, the worker may demand higher wages for a temporary job than a permanent job. 
The temporary help agencies also charge a margin. Productivity may also be lower for those 
under the temporal employment contract, which increase the costs for an efficient unit of 
labor. 
Focusing on such differences in the nature of costs associated with using permanent 
and temporary workers, our stylized model suggests that the firm that experiences higher 
output volatility maintains a higher temporary worker share when firing costs are high. Our 
stylized model also suggests that the firm that expects its output to fall maintains higher 
temporary worker share. When the firm expects its output to fall, it can justify the use of 
temporary workers in the current period, even when the unit labor costs are higher than those 
of permanent employees. This is because the firm can avoid the potential costs associated 
with dismissing permanent employees. In the empirical section of this paper, we test the 
above implications by examining a manufacturing plant’s use of temporary workers.  
Few empirical papers document the characteristics of firms that use temporary 
workers, while the literature has focused on documenting the difference in demographic 
characteristics between temporary and permanent workers (Polivka (1996), Cohany (1998)). 
One reason might have been limited data that provide the detailed characteristics of firms 
using temporary workers. The data is limited because the temporary workers are not on the 
payroll of firms that they engage in production activities. Thus, they are not in the 
employment data collected in the major economic surveys or census, such as the ASM and 
the CM.
3  Abowd, Corbel, and Kramarz (1999) use the French data
4  that allows them to 
distinguish contract type (short-term or permanent) of employment and report that short-term 
                                                           
3 This has also caused issues in labor productivity measure based on payroll data as Houseman (2007) 
points out. Understanding what kind of firms use temporary workers helps us to infer whose labor 
productivity measure might have been influenced. 4 
 
contracts represents high share in hiring and separations.
5  However, the number of firm 
characteristics that are incorporated in their study is limited.  
We use the plant-level data from the Plant Capacity Utilization (PCU) survey 
conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau.
6 The PCU survey began collecting information on the 
number of temporary workers used at manufacturing plants in 1998. The data for 1998, 1999, 
2000, and 2001 are available for our study. We also link the plant-level PCU data to the 
plant-level Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) and the Census of Manufactures (CM), 
which provides us with a unique opportunity to observe a plant’s output fluctuations over 
time. We fit an autoregressive form to a plant’s output trajectories to create a measure of 
output fluctuations and expected output growth.  
While our focus is on testing to what extent firms use temporary workers to 
accommodate output fluctuation, we also discuss other motives. In particular, the use of 
temporary workers has been considered attractive to firms as a means to screen potential 
permanent employees. Autor (2003) points out that THS agency plays a role of facilitating 
worker screening. Given the sometimes significant costs of dismissing poorly performing 
employees, a client firm may want to first observe their performance as temporary workers.  
If that performance is judged inadequate, they can simply request a new worker from the 
THS agency.  Such a trial period as a temporary worker may be preferable to a formal 
probationary period as a permanent employee.  
Depending on the primary motive to use temporary workers, higher expected output 
growth could be associated with greater or lesser use of temporary workers. If the primary 
                                                                                                                                                                             
4 Their data come from four surveys conducted by the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes 
Economiques. 
5 They found that two-thirds of all hiring and more than half of all separations are involved with short-term 
contracts. 
6  These data are used by the Federal Reserve Board to estimate capacity utilization rates for the 
manufacturing and publishing industries. 5 
 
motive to use temporary workers is to reduce the potential costs of dismissing permanent 
workers due to the lower expected output, the expectations of higher output growth would be 
associated with lesser use of temporary workers. In addition, as our stylized model shows, if 
firing costs are sufficiently high, greater uncertainty about future output leads the firm to cap 
the number of permanent workers at a lower level, and thus hire more temporary workers. In 
contrast, if the primary motive to use temporary workers is to screen future permanent 
workers, then higher expected output growth is likely to be associated with greater use of 
temporary workers, because, by doing so, the firm can secure enough qualified workers for 
next period. In the empirical section, we also discuss which stories seem to dominate in our 
findings.  
The different motives to use temporary workers are considered to have different labor 
market outcomes for temporary workers. As Houseman and Polivka (2000) and Houseman 
(2001) point out, while the growth of temporary work arrangements or other non-standard 
arrangements is considered to reduce job stability, if firms use these arrangements primarily 
to screen workers for regular jobs, then  job stability for these workers may increase by 
facilitating better matches between workers and firms. Few empirical papers, however, 
compare the motivations for firms to use temporary workers.
7  
In addition to testing plant’s use of temporary workers in relation to its output 
fluctuation, we also examine how a plant’s temporary worker share depends on a number of 
other characteristics, such as its size, age, and the product that a plant produces.  There are 
number of reasons why plant size may matter for a plant’s use of temporary workers.  One 
might imagine that the use of temporary workers to buffer fluctuations in the labor 
                                                           
7 In Houseman and Polivka (2000), only weak evidence is found for a firm’s use of temporary workers for 
screening purpose, while there was clear evidence that temporary workers face much more job insecurities 
than regular full or pert-time workers. Houseman (2001) also reports many employers report the use of 
temporary workers as accommodating fluctuations in their work load rather than screening. 6 
 
requirement may require a level of sophistication likely to be found in a large plant.  Its larger 
size may also increase a plant’s ability to negotiate a lower margin from a THS firm. In 
addition, a larger plant, with its deeper pockets, may face higher costs in the event of an 
unjust dismissal lawsuit. On the other hand, the larger scale of such a plant may allow the 
plant to be flexible without relying on temporary workers, by redistributing its permanent 
workers across different production processes. Plant age and industry may also matter for the 
use of temporary workers because of their effect on the level of uncertainty and other factors. 
Moreover, we investigate the relationship between the use of temporary workers and 
a plant’s wage and benefit levels. It has been suggested that the use of temporary workers 
may allow client firms to circumvent nondiscrimination requirements in the provision of 
benefits (Houseman, 2001). Under normal circumstances, in order to secure the tax 
advantages associated with providing certain benefits, firms need to provide those benefits to 
all their employees.  If the firm would not otherwise want to provide a certain benefit to a 
particular segment of its workforce, one strategy might be to staff that segment with 
employees of a THS agency.  Having such a dual work force may allow it to provide benefits 
to the remainder of its workforce without jeopardizing their tax status.
8 It is possible that a 
plant whose permanent workers earn high wage rates is more motivated to use temporary 
workers.  However, what should matter for the choice of temporary worker share is the ratio 
of temporary worker to permanent worker wage rates.  Industry observers indicate that THS 
agencies charge client firms a higher markup over wages in the case of higher skilled workers 
(Kilcoyne, 2004). Thus, it is possible that a firm with a high wage rate for permanent workers 
                                                           
8 The legal issues surrounding the employment status of temporary workers are complex.  A temporary 
worker can under some circumstances be considered an employee of the client firm.  In particular, in the 
Microsoft case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that temporary workers who provided services to Microsoft 
for a period of several years were entitled to benefits, including stock options, which Microsoft provided to 
all its permanent employees. The Microsoft decision has limited firms’ ability to implement such a strategy 
of using the same temporary workers for long periods.   7 
 
might use temporary workers less. A similar argument may apply to a firm that provides 
generous benefit packages, although it is also possible that a firm that provides expensive 
benefits packages may have greater incentive to employ temporary workers to keep benefit 
costs low.  
Finally, we analyze how the temporary worker share at the three-digit NAICS 
industry level is dependent upon several additional variables.  These variables include 
unionization, labor turnover rates, and seasonality.  We expect unions to resist the use of 
temporary workers and thus would expect a lesser use of temporary help in an industry with a 
higher unionization rate.  When voluntary turnover is high, the likelihood of a firm needing 
to fire workers due to insufficient demand would be lower.  So, greater turnover could be 
associated with less use of temporary workers.  At the same time, higher voluntary turnover 
rates would likely increase the value of screening potential employees and thus could lead to 
greater use of temporary workers. A stronger seasonal component would also be positively 
correlated with the higher use of temporary workers, ceteris paribus. 
One can view our study as similar in intent to a number of micro-level studies of 
other forms of firm adjustment to demand shocks. For example, using plant-level data, 
Copeland and Hall (2005) examine how automakers accommodate shocks to demand by 
adjusting price, inventories, and labor inputs through temporary layoffs and overtime work. 
Such considerations are closely linked to a firm’s decision to adjust temporary worker share. 
We intend to examine such interactions in future work. 
In Section 2, we provide a stylized model that motivates our empirical specification. 
In Section 3, we describe our data in more detail and discuss empirical implementation. In 




2.  Motivational Model  
In this section, we present a stylized model of a plant’s choice on the number of permanent 
and temporary workers. The model is intended to help motivate and guide our empirical work, 
emphasizing the role of temporary workers in accommodating output fluctuations. 
We assume that labor is the only factor of production and that, in each period, the 
plant manager must hire an appropriate quantity of labor,  t e , to meet an exogenously 
determined level of output, () tt y fe = , where  f is a standard, strictly increasing production 
function.  The required labor input come from a combination of  “permanent employees,”  t p , 
and “agency temporary workers,”  t a , with the total quantity of labor given by  tt t ep a θ =+ , 
where θ  is a positive constant representing the productivity of a temporary worker relative to 
that of a permanent worker.  The wage rates for permanent and temporary workers are  p w  
and a w , respectively.  The plant incurs costs, δ , to fire each permanent worker.  Thus, the 
plant’s total costs in a period are  1 max( ,0) pt a t t t wp wa p p δ − + +− . We assume that future 
levels of output are uncertain and that the firm minimizes the expected present value of total 
costs given a discount factor, 1/(1 ) r β =+ , where γ is a real interest rate. 
Let the unit labor costs for permanent workers be  pp uw ≡ and that for temporary 
workers / aa uw θ ≡ . We assume that 0 ap uu u Δ =−> ; absent firing costs, temporary workers 
are more expensive, either because their wage rate is higher ( ap ww > ), they are less 
productive ( 1 θ < ), or both.
9  We further assume that the cost of firing a permanent worker is 
                                                           
9 Kilcoyne shows that, for a given low-skilled occupation, temporary workers are paid lower hourly wages. 
This may reflect their lower productivity; for low-skilled jobs where experience or reputation is not 
important for future employment, it may be difficult to motivate temporary workers to achieve a high level 
of performance because their efforts would not, typically, be rewarded by promotion or future wage 
increases. The legal limit of a temporary employment contract duration would also imply that temporary 
employment would not increase a worker’s firm-specific skills and knowledge. In high-skilled occupations, 9 
 
greater than the (discounted) difference in unit labor costs, but less than a full period’s wage; 
i.e., / p uw β δ Δ< < .  If  u βδ Δ> , the plant never hires any temporary workers; it is cheaper 
to use permanent workers even if it is certain that they will be fired in the next period.  The 
condition that  p w δ < is a convenient simplification implying that the firm does not keep any 
idle workers on the payroll; keeping an idle worker on the payroll costs more than firing the 
worker in the current period and may also increase firing costs in the future. With this 
configuration of costs, the plant faces a tradeoff between using more permanent workers, 
which lowers current wage costs, versus using more temporary workers, which may lower 
future firing costs. 
 
The Two-Period Case 
It is easiest to see the logic of the model when there are only two periods.  In this case, the 
plant is unconcerned about firing costs in the second period.  Let  2 y represent a required 
output level in the second period. The plant meets its entire labor need with permanent 
workers, 
1
22 () p fy
− = , incurring costs 
11
22 1 2 () m a x ( 0 , () ) p Cw fy pfy δ
−− =+ − . 
  In the first period, given 1 y and knowledge of the distribution of 2 y , the firm chooses 
1 p and  1 a to minimize total expected discounted costs, TC , which is written as 
11
11 2 1 2 [ ( ) max(0, ( ))] pa p TC w p w a E w f y p f y βδ
−− =+ + + − .  The quantity of labor that 
meets the required level of production is
1
111 () f ypa θ
− =+ .  Thus, we can rewrite TC as a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
temporary workers are often paid higher hourly wages than permanent workers (Kilcoyne,2005). For 
example, on average, registered nurses sent by THS agencies earn an hourly wage that is $4.93 more than 
the national average for this occupation in 2004. Computer programmers sent by THS agencies earn $7.85 
more per hour than those hired as permanent employees. For occupations in which past experience or 
licenses help firms identify workers’ skills, firms would be able to select temporary workers who are 
qualified to meet a given performance level. Among workers with the same qualifications, however, they 10 
 
function of  1 p  alone: 
11 1
11 1 2 1 2 ( ( ) ) [ ( ) max(0, ( ))] pa p TC u p u f y p E w f y p f y βδ
−− − =+ − + + − . 




( ) [max(0, ( )]
dTC d
p uE p f y
dp dp
βδ
− =− Δ + − .    (1) 
Assume that  2 y  follows a continuous distribution with density  2 () gy that is strictly 
positive over the relevant interval; distribution function is  2 () Gy .  Then, the expected 
number of permanent workers fired in the second period given  1 p is 
1 () 11
11 2 1 2 2 2 0 ( ) [max(0, ( )] ( ( )) ( )
fp
Lp E p f y p f y gy d y
−− =− = − ∫ . Thus the derivative of the 
number of permanent workers fired w.r.t. permanent labor in period 1 is  
1 () 1
11 1 1 2 2 1 0 ()( ( () ) ( () ) () ( () )
fp
Lp p f fp gfp gyd y Gfp
− ′ =− + = ∫ .    (2) 





p uG f p
dp
βδ =−Δ + .                      (3) 
Increasing permanent workers by one (and thus lowering the number of temporary workers 
by 1/θ ) in period 1 reduces current costs by the difference in unit costs between temporary 
and permanent workers ( u Δ ), but raises expected firing costs in the second period by the 
product of the cost of firing a worker (δ ) and the probability that the marginal worker is 
fired ( (() ) Gfp ). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
would not take temporary positions unless compensation for job insecurity is provided. Employers may 
also be willing to pay a premium to quickly meet, say, a sudden increase in demand. 11 
 























→∞ = −Δ + > . Thus, there exists a 
unique level of permanent employment,  p , such that  
1
() (() ) 0
dTC
pu G f p
dp
βδ =− Δ + = .                (4) 
See Figure 1 for an illustration of the case in which  2 y is uniformly distributed in the interval 
from  low y to  high y  and  () f e is linear. If 
1
1 () f yp
− < , as permanent employment increases,  
TC decreases until permanent employment reaches the level that satisfies the plant’s labor 
requirements given  1 y .  Thus, the optimal number of permanent workers is 
1
1 () f y
− , and that 
of temporary workers is zero.  On the other hand, if 
1
1 () f yp
− > , TC  falls with  1 p  until 
1 p p = , and then begins to rise.  Thus the optimal number of permanent workers is  p , and 
that of temporary workers is 
1
1 (( )) / fy p θ
− − , the level necessary to meet the rest of the 
labor requirement.  We can summarize the solution by writing the optimal numbers of the 
first period permanent workers, 
*
1 p , and temporary workers, 
*
1 a , as  
*1
11 min( ( ), ) p fy p
− =             (5) 
*1 *
11 1 (( ) ) / af y p θ
− =− ,              (6) 
where  p satisfies  (() ) Gfp u βδ =Δ . The plant hires permanent workers up to a maximum 
level at which the expected discounted costs of firing an additional permanent worker are 
equal to the extra current unit labor costs of substituting temporary workers.  In Appendix A, 
we show that in the case of an infinite horizon with independently and identically distributed 12 
 
(i.i.d.) random output levels; the plant’s optimal policy is essentially identical to the solution 
of the first period of the two-period model. 
 
Lognormal Output Levels and Power Production Function 
Suppose that the distribution of  2 y  is lognormal, 2 log y  ~ 
2
2 (, ) N μ σ and that the production 
function takes the power form, 
() f eA e
α = .          ( 7 )  









Δ= Φ , where  () x Φ is the 
standard normal distribution function.  Alternatively, we can write 
11





=− + Φ .      (8) 
The impact of σ  on  p depends on  u Δ and firing costs δ .
10  If firing costs are sufficiently 
high so that 
1
2





Φ< , and the probability of needing to fire the 
marginal worker is less than one half. In this case, greater uncertainty increases the 
probability, moving it toward one half.  The increased probability of firing causes the plant to 
use fewer permanent workers and more temporary workers to produce the given output.
11   
 
                                                           
10 Becauseα and δ are positive constants and 
1()
− Φ ⋅ is an increasing function, a higher value of  u Δ is 
associated with a greater level for  p , leading to the use of fewer temporary workers.  On the other hand, a 
higher value of the firing cost, δ , is associated with a lower level of p , leading to the use of more 
temporary workers.  
11 Note that the opposite is true if firing costs are low so that (1/ 2) u βδ Δ > . It is somewhat counterintuitive 
that an increase in uncertainty could lead to the use of fewer temporary workers. When firing costs are low, 
the plant worries little about firing and thus hires so many permanent workers that the probability of firing 
a marginal permanent worker in the second period exceeds one half. In such a situation, an increase in the 
uncertainty in the second period labor requirements lowers the probability of firing to the level closer to 13 
 
 
Implications for Empirical Analysis 
The simple model sketched above suggests that expected output growth,  21 log
e gy μ ≡− , is 
an important determinant of a plant’s use of temporary workers. When 
e g is lower, the model 
suggests that firms tend to use more temporary workers in order to avoid future firing costs. 
The model also says that if firing costs are high enough, higher uncertainty, σ , increases the 
use of temporary workers.  These are two key hypotheses we test in the empirical section. As 
noted above, if screening is the primary reason why firms use temporary workers, then in 
contrast to the above model, higher expected output growth would be associated with greater 
use of temporary workers. 
 
3. Empirical Implementation and Construction of Variables 
Empirical Specification 
Using (7) and (8) and assuming for simplicity that α and  Aare one, the condition that a plant 
hires temporary workers is  
1







=− − Φ > .   (9) 
Introducing heterogeneity across plants through a normally distributed random components 
in log output,  i ν , and assuming (9) can be well approximated by a linear function, we can 
rewrite the condition that a plant uses temporary workers as  [,,] 0
e
ii i i i Zg σν = +> X β , 
where  i X contains other control variables. The plant uses no temporary workers when  i Z  is 
negative; once  i Z  is positive, the plant begins using temporary workers, and its temporary 
                                                                                                                                                                             
one half. This reduces the marginal expected firing costs and gives the plant the incentive to hire more 
permanent workers.    14 
 
worker share increases as  i Z   continues to increase. Both a plant’s likelihood to use 
temporary workers and its temporary worker share increases with 
e
i g and  i σ . 
                To examine a plant’s discrete choice to use any temporary workers, we estimate the 
Probit model. We also estimate Tobit models to examine how the temporary worker share is 
associated with our key variables. The Tobit model is consistent with our framework in that 
plants start using temporary workers once  i Z becomes positive and continue to increase their 
use of temporary workers as  i Z   increases further. Using the observations on plants with 
positive numbers of temporary workers, we also fit linear regression models relating the 
continuous part of temporary worker share to our key variables, thus relaxing a restriction 
imposed by Tobit analysis.  i X   includes industry dummies as well as other plant 
characteristics such as plant size and age that may proxy for variation in the level of firing 
costs and wage differentials between temporary and permanent workers, which the model 
says should also influence the use of temporary workers.  
 
Data  
The main data set for this study is the Plant Capacity Utilization (PCU) survey from 1998, 
1999, 2000, and 2001.
12 The surveys collect information only for the fourth quarter of each 
year. The key variable for our study is the number of temporary production workers. In the 
PCU questionnaires, temporary production workers are defined as “production workers not 
on the payroll (hired through temporary help agencies or as their own agent)”.
13  
                                                           
12  The PCU survey is used by the Federal Reserve Board to estimate capacity utilization rates of 
manufacturing and publishing plants http://www.census.gov/econ/overview/ma0500.html (August 2006) 
13 In the PCU questionnaires, “production workers” are defined as workers (up through the line-supervisor 
level) engaged in fabricating, processing, assembling, inspecting, receiving, packing, warehousing, 
shipping (but not delivering), maintenance, repair, janitorial, guard services, product development, 
auxiliary production for plant’s own use (e.g., power plant), record keeping, and other closely associated 
services. They also include truck drivers delivering ready-mixed concrete (U.S Census Bureau, 2000). Note 15 
 
In our empirical work, we include manufacturing plants that are in operation and that 
provide valid answers to the key employment questions. We further select those for which we 
can calculate measures of the expected level and volatility of production; (we describe in 
detail below.) We also limited our sample to plants that appear in the ASM for enough 
consecutive years prior to being in the PCU to allow us to use lagged variables in the 
regressions. Appendix B provides more details about which plants are included in our sample.  




i g  
As our stylized model shows, expected output growth is a key variable in determining a 
plant’s use of temporary workers.  In order to create an empirical measure of this variable, we 
have to make three choices.  We have to specify the current period, the future period, and 
how the expectation of the future period’s output is estimated. Because information on 
temporary worker employment from the PCU is that of the fourth quarter, we take the current 
period to be the fourth quarter of the survey year. We use the annualized fourth quarter total 
value of shipments (TVS) reported in the PCU survey as the current output; the ASM and the 
CM, which we use to estimate time series process for TVS, report annual TVS. As a future 
period, one could view the length of the horizon considered by the plant for employment 
decisions as an empirical question to be investigated thoroughly.  However, given that no 
monthly or quarterly output series at plant-level are available, we take the entire year 
following the survey to be the future period.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
that while the PCU provides employment and hours data for each shift, examining the allocation of 
permanent and temporary workers between different shifts is beyond the scope of this paper. We focus on a 
plant’s overall use of temporary workers for all shifts in total.   16 
 
Let us define the annualized fourth quarter output for plant i in year t as 
44 ln(4 )
AQ Q
it it ltvs tvs ≡× , where 
4 Q





it t it it g E ltvs ltvs + ≡− , where  1 [] ti t E ltvs + is plant i’s expected  TVS in year  1 t + . 
,4 eQ
it g  reflects the difference between the current quarter’s output and the expected average 
quarterly output over the next year.  
 
Specification for the Expected Output Level and the Uncertainty Level 
To measure expected future output,  1 [] ti t E ltvs + , as well as the uncertainty, σ , for each plant, 
we use the time series data of the plant’s TVS from the ASM and the CM. The combination 
of ASM and CM, often called the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), provides us 
annual time series data for the U.S. manufacturing plants. While the CM is a population 
survey and is conducted every five years, the ASM is a sample survey in off-census years. 
Thus, we observe the TVS of all manufacturing plants in a census year as long as they exist, 
but in off-census years, we observe only for plants sampled in the ASM.
  Using a plant 
identification number, which is given based on the physical location of the plant, we match 
these data to PCU by plant identification number to learn the nature of each plant’s output 
fluctuation. To use a consistent plant identifier, we limit ourselves to the ASM and CM 
observations from 1976 and after;
14 the final year we use is 2001. We focus on real TVS by 
employing the TVS deflator for each of 4-digit SIC calculated by Bartelsman, Becker, and 
                                                           
14 As a plant identifier, we use the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) number, which is a revised 
version of the Permanent Plant Number (PPN) used for manufacturing plants in the Longitudinal Research 
Data. Similar to the PPN, the LBD number does not change in the event of merger and acquisition and is 
specific to a plant’s physical location. The LBD number is created as a part of the effort by Census to create 
the LBD data set, which reviews and updates the longitudinal linkage as well as the operation status of the 
establishments/plants in the Standard Statistical Establishment List.  While the Census of Manufactures 
goes back to 1963, the LBD begins in 1976. 17 
 
Gray.
15 As we previously noted, monthly and quarterly series on plant level TVS are not 
available in the ASM, CM, or any other sources that can be matched to PCU. Thus we 
analyze output fluctuations at the annual frequency.  
Note that, to measure the fluctuation that the plant faces in its demand or output, one 
might also consider using a plant’s employment given by the Longitudinal Business Database 
(LBD), which provide annual employment data for virtually all U.S. business establishments 
(that have employees). However, like most other data sources, the employment reported in 
the LBD includes only workers on a plant’s payroll and thus excludes temporary workers. To 
the extent that a plant uses temporary workers to accommodate output fluctuations, 
permanent employment fluctuations should be smoother than the fluctuation of all workers 
including temporary workers. Thus, any unobserved or uncontrolled factors that increase a 
plant’s use of temporary workers may be translated into a smaller fluctuation in permanent 
employment, which biases our estimation. Thus, in this paper, we use TVS from the ASM-
CM data to capture output fluctuations.
16  
  We assume that output growth follows a first order autoregressive process.  In 
particular, denoting the growth rate of TVS bygtvs , we estimate: 
11 it i i it i t it gtvs gtvs dn β ργ υ −− =+ + + % ,        (12) 
where  1 tt t dn n n − ≡− ;  t n is a macroeconomic variable that captures the business cycle. Any 
linear plant-specific time trend is captured by i β % . The uncertainty measure  i σ  is the standard 
deviation of the residuals of the model, which is written as 
11 [] [ ] it t it it t it it gtvs E gtvs ltvs E ltvs υ −− −= − =  and represents unforeseeable events after a plant 
                                                           
15 http://www.nber.org/nberces/ We thank Randy Becker for letting us use the preliminary version of the 
TVS deflators for the later period. 
16 Note that labor hours reported in ASM and CM suffer the same problem, as they include only the hours 
worked by permanent employees. The LBD does not provide any data on labor hours. 18 
 
observes the output or growth rate from the previous year. For  t n , we use the deviation of log 
real gross domestic products (GDP) from log potential GDP provided by the Congressional 
Budget Office.  
 
Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the variables we use in the analyses. On average, 
,4 eQ
it g varies widely across plants.  i σ is on average 0.19. Large heterogeneity in  i σ across 
plants is also observed. A plant with  i σ  that is one standard deviation (s.d.) larger than the 
mean experiences annual output levels that typically deviate from the expected output by 
over 30%.  
In our sample, the fraction of plants employing a positive number of temporary 
workers in a particular year is 41%. The remaining 59% of plants operate without using any 
temporary workers. Of plants with temporary workers, on average, the temporary worker 
share of total production workers is about 12%.  
 
Other Control Variables in Analyses 
We also include a number of additional control variables. The most important of these is a 
variable that controls for the previous level of permanent employees. As we mentioned above, 
our two-period model does not address how the previous level of permanent workers 
influences a plant’s current use of temporary workers. However, in reality, if a plant’s 
permanent employment in the previous period is greater than the level required to produce 
the current output, then to respond to any positive shock to the current output, a plant would 
be more likely to rely on already hired permanent workers and less likely to rely on 
temporary workers. Indeed, in a version of our model with more realistic time series 19 
 
processes for output, the number of permanent workers from the previous period is a state 
variable. As a remedy, one might consider controlling for the level of permanent employment, 
1 t p − , in the previous period. However, in the cross-section, such a variable may capture other 
factors. While the model assumed a homogenous production function, plants are, in fact, 
heterogeneous. A high level of  1 t p − may simply mean that the plant is unproductive, rather 
than that it has a binding level of permanent workers on its payroll.  
  As an alternative way to control for variation in the previous number of permanent 
workers relative to current output levels, we include plants’ recent output growth rates.
17  If a 
plant’s output has been growing, it is unlikely that the number of permanent workers in the 
last period is binding. However, if output has been falling, the number of permanent workers 
inherited from the previous period may constrain the plant; in this case, even when a plant’s 
current output is greater for a given future expected level, the plant would be unlikely to use 
temporary workers. 
In addition to the control for the previous level of permanent employees, we control 
for several other variables that may influence a plant’s use of temporary workers. Such 
variables include plant size age, and whether a plant is a part of a multi-plant firm or not. For 
plant size, we use 
4 AQ
it ltvs . Age is measured based on the first year that a plant’s identifier for 
its physical location appeared in the LBD.  
As we discussed earlier, we also include various other variables. We control for the 
wage rate of permanent workers and the ratio of benefit payments to wages at plant-level. To 
calculate the permanent production worker wage rate, 
P
it w , for each plant, we use the ASM; the 
PCU does not provide any wage information. Note that we cannot distinguish overtime hours 
from total production hours in the ASM. Thus the calculation for 
P
it w is influenced by wage 20 
 
premium for overtime; 
P
it w would be greater for plants that use more overtime. If a plant’s use of 
overtime is motivated by a reason similar to why they use temporary workers, it would induce the 
positive correlation between 
P
it w and temporary worker share. Thus, we calculate the straight rate 
permanent worker wage,  (1 .5 )
SP P over
it it it ww s ≡+ , using the overtime share, 
over
it s ,
18  from the PCU, 
and use  this measure  in our regressions. We also use the ASM to calculate supplemental labor 
costs for each dollar of wage payments.
19  
We further add the unionization rate, turnover rate, and the seasonal factor for the 
fourth quarter at 3-digit SIC industry level. The unionization rate, turnover rate, and seasonal 
component are all calculated at the three-digit SIC level, as plant-level information is not 
available.  The data on the unionization rate among production workers are derived from the 
monthly outgoing rotation files of the Current Population Survey (CPS).  We pooled data 
from 1996 through 2000 to estimate the rate of unionization for each three-digit SIC industry.  
As a proxy for voluntary turnover, we use job-to-job transition rates based on the non-
outgoing rotation groups of CPS.
20 The job-to-job transition rate would be more associated 
with the tendency of voluntary quit than the overall turnover rate.
 21 Again, we pool all data 
                                                                                                                                                                             
17 A dummy variable for a survey year is also included. 
18 The PCU data provide information on hours for all production workers (including temporary workers), 
hours worked by temporary workers (including overtime if any), and total overtime. Assuming that 
overtime is performed only by permanent workers, we use the ratio of the overtime to the hours worked by 
permanent workers. We also used the ratio of overtime to hours worked by all workers, which did not 
qualitatively change our results. 
19 Supplemental labor costs are not provided separately for production and non-production workers in the 
ASM/CM. We divide such a total number by wage payments to all employees. Note that some years in the 
micro data provide the decomposition of supplemental labor costs into voluntary and non-voluntary parts. 
Such data are not available for the years relevant to this study. 
20 The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) produces a voluntary quit rate, but only at the level of broad 
industry category, which does not provide us enough detail for our study. 
21   Specifically, we matched each observation in the non-outgoing rotations to the corresponding 
observation in the following month using the household ID and line numbers. In addition, we required that 
the sex of respondents match and that the reported ages be within one year of each other.  We then 
determined which workers remained employed at the same firm as in the previous month using the 
employment status variable and the indicator for whether an employed worker remained at his previous 
employer.  This latter variable is available starting in 1996 and makes possible the identification of job-to-
job transitions. See Fallick and Flieshman (2004). 21 
 
since 1996 for each detailed CPS industry. We also calculate seasonal components for each 
3-digit SIC based on the industrial production (IP) quarterly series (not seasonally adjusted) 
for the period between 1987 and 2005 from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. 
Denoting IP of industry j in qth quarter in year y  by using 
q
jt IP , we specify the seasonal 
component of qth quarter for industry j , 
q
j f , as  {ln(4 ) ln( )}
qq
jj t j t
t
f IP IP ≡× − ∑ . When we 
include the above 3-digit SIC level variables in our models, we report standard errors that 
account for clustering at the 3-digit SIC level.   
Table 1 includes the summary statistics of the above variables. Plants in our sample 
are much bigger and older than that of average manufacturing plants in the CM for 1997. 
Plant TVS is on average 54 million based on the 1987 dollar.  Sixty-one percent of the plants 
in our sample exist in 1975 or before. 
 
4. Results 
In Table 2, we report results with our base specification with and without industry dummies. 
The net effects of 
,4 eQ
it g is negative and significant, and  i σ is positive and significant. The 
data seem to support the view that higher expected growth decreases both a plant’s likelihood 
of using temporary workers and, for a plant that uses temporary workers, decreases its 
temporary worker share. The model in section 2 illustrated that the expectation of growth 
reduces the probability for a marginal permanent worker to be fired, which in turn reduces 
the expected future firing costs and motivates a plant to use more permanent workers.  Our 
results are consistent with such a view. Note that, as we discussed, it is still possible that a 
higher expectation of growth might necessitate more screening of future permanent workers 
and thus more current temporary workers, but in our analysis, such effects seem to be 
dominated by the former effect. It is also possible that screening matters for short-run growth 22 
 
prospects, while our data do not allow us to capture plant-level growth rates at the monthly or 
quarterly levels. 
We also perform the analysis, controlling for a variable representing a current year 
shock,  1[] it t it ltvs E ltvs − − , to see if our data identify any effect of current shock separate from 
that of 
,4 eQ
it g . The results are in Appendix C. We find that, even after controlling for a current 
year shock, the coefficient for the expected growth rate remains negative and significant. The 
measure of current shock obtains a positive and significant coefficient. The size of the effect 
of 
,4 eQ
it g remains almost the same. Note that, in this regression, we exclude  it gtvs as it is 
highly correlated with the current year shock measure. 
Based on the Probit result with industry dummies, if 
,4 eQ
it g  increases by a one s.d. 
from its average, moving from 0.12 to 0.56, the probability to use temporary workers 
decreases from 0.42 to 0.39. Based on the Tobit results with industry dummies, for plants 
using temporary workers, a one s.d. increase in 
,4 eQ
it g decreases the temporary worker share 
by 1.2 percentage points, which is 10% of the average temporary worker share. 
Plants that face more uncertainty appear to use more temporary workers. As we also 
discussed, when firing costs are large enough, it is possible that greater uncertainty increases 
the probability of marginal permanent worker to be fired, discouraging plants to use 
permanent employees. For plants using temporary workers, the uncertainty level that is one 
s.d. greater than average is associated with temporary worker share that that is 0.6 percentage 
points lower than average, based on the Tobit and OLS results with industry dummies.
22 
                                                           
22 We also performed Probit and Tobit analyses replacing expected annual output level in  1 t + with its 
realized value. For this exercise, out of 4,909 plants used in Table 3, we used the data of 4,617 plants, 
which appear in ASM sample in the year following their PCU survey. The results remain qualitatively the 
same. 23 
 
We also performed quantile regression analysis using the data of plants with 
temporary workers to see whether the magnitude of effects vary between plants in different 
quartiles of the distribution of the temporary worker share. The quantile regressions showed 
that, among plants with temporary workers, the magnitudes of the effects of our key variables 
are much greater for plants with higher temporary worker shares. Once we replace our 
dependent variable with log of the temporary worker share, however, the quantile regressions 
obtain almost the same coefficients across all quantiles. It seems that the effects of our key 
variables are constant in terms of the percentage by which they increase the share.  
  Let us now look at the coefficients of other variables. The results generally suggest 
that bigger plants are more likely to use temporary workers, and if they do, the temporary 
worker share is greater than smaller plants. It is possible that fixed costs are involved in using 
temporary workers for, perhaps, negotiating with temporary help agencies. The results may 
also be reflecting that larger plants are more likely to face greater penalty in the event of an 
unjust dismissal lawsuit. Such effect seems to offset possible negative effect, if any, from the 
larger plants’ ability to redistribute workers within itself. A one s.d. increase in 
4 AQ
it ltvs raises 
a plant’s likelihood to use temporary workers by 4.1 percentage points. Note that the ability 
to negotiate or allocate workers should be better captured at firm level rather than plant level.  
Our analysis also control for a dummy indicating whether the plant is affiliated with multi-
plant firm.
23 The dummy obtains a positive coefficient for Probit and a negative coefficient 
for OLS. It is possible that the plants in a multi-plant firm can share the fixed costs, which 
justify each plant to use temporary worker even by a small amount. 
We found that older plants tend to use temporary workers less. The likelihood for 
plants built pre-1975 to use temporary workers is 8.2 percentage points smaller than newer 
                                                           
23 Firm output size is not available. 24 
 
plants. For plants using temporary workers, the temporary worker share for older plants is 3.7 
percentage points lower than the young plants. Plant age may reflect the degree of 
uncertainty that is not captured by σ . While σ  is an average measure of uncertainty over the 
lifecycle of a plant, the degree of uncertainty may change over time.    
While we treated firms’ output level to be exogenous, in reality, a firm’s use of 
flexible labor can influence a firm’s output adjustment. To the degree that such adjustments 
are not predicted by equation (12), it may decrease or increase our measure of uncertainty 
level. For example, with the easy access to temporary workers, under negative labor 
productivity shocks, a firm may be able to keep the firm’s output stable using temporary 
workers rather than decreasing the firm’s output; this may lower our measure of uncertainty 
level. On the other hand, the firm may adjust outputs more flexibly having the access to 
temporary workers; this may increase our measure of uncertainty level. Such effects are 
screened out to some extend by industry dummies and other controls. As we show later, we 
also control for geographical area fixed effects and the key results remain the same.  
However, as a robustness analysis, we also create a variable for a plant’s output 
volatility using only the data before 1985. The THS industry grew rapidly starting late 1980s. 
Before 1985, the use of THS by manufacturing plants was not common.
24 The growth of THS 
industry might have reduced the costs to deal with temporary employment assignments, and 
enhanced the manufacturing plants’ use of temporary workers in general. Thus by using the 
output data before 1985, we can capture a manufacturing plant’s output volatility minimizing 
the influence by its use of temporary workers. We denote the new measure by 
1985 pre σ
− % . The 
results are presented in Table 3. As you can see, the coefficients for 
1985 pre σ
− % are positive, and 
for the Probit analysis, the coefficient turns more significant than we saw in Table 2. 25 
 
Next we explore the effect of other variables, including wage, unionization rate, job-
to-job transition rates, and seasonality. The results are summarized in Table 4. First, let us 
look at the effect of two variables that summarize the compensation paid to permanent 
workers. As discussed earlier, one might expect that plants that pay high wages or high 
benefits would have an incentive to use temporary workers to reduce labor costs.  In contrast, 
industry analysts report that the markup that staffing agencies charge over wages for 
temporary workers tends to be higher for high wage occupations.  Thus, higher wage plants 
may use fewer temporary workers.  In our analysis, the latter story seems dominate. The 
straight rate wage for permanent production workers and the supplemental labor costs per 
dollar of permanent worker wages are both negatively correlated with plants’ use of 
temporary workers. Note that when we control for these two variables, the positive 
coefficient obtained for plant size becomes bigger. Since larger plants tend to pay higher 
wages, once we separate the negative effect of wage, the scale effect seems to be more 
pronounced. 
  Next we add the unionization rate, the turnover rate, and the fourth-quarter seasonal 
component, which we measure at the three-digit SIC level. Columns 4, 5, 6 in Table 4 show 
the results where we replace three-digit SIC dummies with these three continuous variables. 
The results seem to suggest that the unionization rate is negatively correlated with a plant’s 
use of temporary workers. This is counter to the idea that unions might increase the use of 
temporary workers through their effect in increasing wages as well as firing costs relative to 
productivity. Similar results are found in the study by Houseman (2001). Analogous to what 
she argues, it is possible that our results reflect the fact that unions oppose the use of non-
standard employment relationships to secure regular employment positions. Note that the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
24  Based on the BLS’s Occupational Employment Statistics data, the workers defined as “production 
workers” in that survey represents only 4.4% of THS workers in 1990, where in 2007, it is 19.2%.  26 
 
coefficient for unionization rate is not significant in the OLS result. The unionization rate 
may not influence the temporary worker share once plants decide to use temporary workers. 
Note that we also examined whether the unionization rate has any interaction effect 
with
,4 eQ
it g , which seems to suggest that greater union pressures against the use of temporary 
work arrangements also enhance the negative effect of 
,4 eQ
it g on a plants’ likelihood to use 
temporary workers. 
  Coefficients for the job-to-job transition rate are not significant in any specification. 
This is different from our original conjecture that higher voluntary turnover reduces the 
probability of needing to fire permanent workers in the future and thus increases the 
permanent worker share. As we discussed, it is possible that greater voluntary turnover 
increases the on-going need to screen workers through temporary employment, and this 
might have offset the effect of the decreased probability of needing to fire permanent workers. 
The coefficients for the fourth-quarter seasonal component are positive and significant; the 
higher seasonal component for output increases the use of temporary workers. 
  Note that in the specifications with the above additional controls, the coefficients for 
our key variables, 
,4 eQ
it g and σ , are still consistent with our conjectures. It would be, however, 
instructive to note that the variations of our control variables such as wage, benefit, and 
unionization rate seem to have relatively large contribution to the overall variation of the 
plants’ use of temporary workers. Based on the Probit analysis in Column 4 in Table 4, one 
s.d. increase in wage, benefit, unionization rate, and fourth-quarter seasonal factor decrease 
the probability for a plant to use some temporary workers by 6.9, 2.8, 3.8, and 2.7 percentage 
points, respectively. In terms of the variation of temporary worker shares across plants, based 
on the Tobit analysis in Column 5 in Table 4, one s.d. increase in wage, benefit, unionization 27 
 
rate, and fourth-quarter seasonal factor decrease the share by 2.6, 1.1, 1.2, and 1.1 percentage 
points, respectively.  
Finally, we examine whether our key results hold when we control for the effects of 
geographical variables. In Columns 1, 2, 3 in Table 5, we show the results based on our base 
specification, adding a dummy indicating urban plants (plants in metropolitan areas). We 
then limit our sample to urban plants and control for Metropolitan statistical area fixed effects 
in addition to three-digit industry effects. We find that in both cases, the effect of our key 
variables stay qualitatively the same. We also found that plants in urban area are more likely 
to use temporary workers. To the extent that markets for temporary worker are local, there 
are many geographic variables such as the unemployment rate and the degree of local 
concentration of temporary agencies, which would be associated with a plant’s use of 
temporary workers. Examining the effect of these variables requires a thorough consideration 
of local labor markets. We leave it to our future research to explore the influence of local 
demand and supply of the temporary workers on a plant’s use of temporary workers.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We have provided some evidence in support of the proposition that temporary work 
arrangements facilitate flexibility in a firm’s use of labor and allow it to accommodate output 
fluctuations at lower cost.  Our stylized model identifies the expected output growth rate and 
the uncertainty in that expectation as two key variables in a firm’s decision to use temporary 
workers. We approximated both of these variables using the ASM and the CM. We used 
Probit, Tobit, and OLS analyses to examine the relationship between these two variables and 
plants’ use of temporary workers. 
  First, we find that plants make greater use of temporary workers when their expected 
output growth is lower. This suggests that a plant chooses temporary workers over permanent 28 
 
workers when it expects its output to fall and thus wants to avoid costs associated with 
dismissing permanent employees.  This effect remains identified after netting out the effect of 
a seasonal factor in a plant’s output, which itself had a positive relationship with a plant’s use 
of temporary workers, as well as other variables.  
Second, we find that a plant with greater uncertainty over its future output level uses 
more temporary workers. Firing costs appear to be large enough to induce a more volatile 
plant to make greater attempts to minimize the costs of firing permanent workers; this might 
have made the plant rely more on temporary workers even though the current unit costs of 
using temporary workers is greater than those for permanent workers.  
  In addition to output fluctuations, we also examine the effect of several other 
motivations that are thought to play an important role in a plant’s decision to use temps. First, 
we found evidence that a plant’s that requires high-skill workers are less likely to use 
temporary workers, likely because the wage premium or the margin paid to agencies for 
high-skill temporary workers may be higher than that for low-skill temporary workers. 
Second, a plant in an industry that is highly unionized seems to use fewer temporary workers, 
possibly because unions are successful in resisting the use of nonmembers’ labor. 
 29 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Plant characteristics (10,964 observations) 
 Mean  (S.d.) 
,4 eQ
it g   .120 .420 
i σ   .195 .121 
4 AQ
it ltvs   10.9 1.34 
it gtvs : growth rate of annual real output in survey years  -0.0164 0.247 
1 it gtvs − : growth rate of annual real output in previous 
years 0.0179  0.245 
Percentage of plants that existed from 1975 or before:     60.5% 
Percentage of plants belonging to a multi-unit firms        91.3% 
Percentage of plants in urban areas  71.4% 
 
Three-digit SIC level variables included in the study (8,142 observations)† 
ln. straight wage of perm production worker
† 2.67  0.355 
Benefit per $1 perm wage
† 0.274  0.105 
Unionization rates  0.234  0.116 
Job-to-job transition rates  0.0200  0.00568 
Fourth quarter seasonal factor  0.00793  0.0415 
†: The sample is restricted due to the missing observations of overtime used to calculate 





Table 2.  Base specification 
  Without 3-digit SIC dummies  With 3-digit SIC dummies 
 
Probit 
(dF/dX) Tobit OLS 
Probit 

















 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Expected growth 
,4 eQ





ti t i t E ltvs ltvs + −  
-0.0556*** -0.0248***  -0.00872**  -0.0665*** -0.0285***  -0.0116*** 
[4.62] [5.21]  [2.04]  [5.29] [6.08]  [2.79] 
 
Volatility measure  i σ   0.0271 0.0424***  0.0602***  0.0667 0.0497***  0.0494*** 




it ltvs   0.0411*** 0.0167***  0.00362**  0.0304*** 0.00900***  -0.0017 
 [10.60]  [10.82]  [2.55]  [6.35]  [5.02]  [1.04] 
 
Growth rate  it gtvs  
=  1 it it ltvs ltvs − −  
 
0.162*** 0.0721***  0.0261***  0.157*** 0.0673***  0.0273*** 
[7.79] [8.83]  [3.29]  [7.35] [8.51]  [3.59] 
 
Growth rate (t-1)  1 it gtvs −  
=  12 it it ltvs ltvs −− −  
 
0.0670*** 0.0302***  0.0122*  0.0622*** 0.0293***  0.0155** 
[3.29] [3.79]  [1.74]  [2.95] [3.79]  [2.24] 
 
1 D : =1 for plants born pre 
1975 
 
-0.0902*** -0.0429***  -0.0199***  -0.0821*** -0.0374***  -0.0203*** 
[9.21] [11.01]  [6.21]  [7.96] [9.74]  [6.20] 
 
2 D : =1for plants affiliated 
w/ multi-unit firms 
 
0.0347* 0.00421  -0.0188***  0.0314* 0.00510  -0.0129** 
[1.94] [0.58]  [2.91]  [1.67] [0.71]  [2.05] 
            
3-digit SIC dummies  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Survey year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 














Table 3. Robustness Check with a volatility measure calculated using pre-1985 data 
 
 Probit  (dF/dX)  Tobit  OLS 
 
D=1for plants w/ 
temps  Temp Share  Temp Share 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Expected growth 
,4 eQ





ti t i t E ltvs ltvs + −  
 
-0.0415** -0.0187***  -0.0130** 
[2.24] [2.85]  [2.02] 
 
Volatility measure based 














it ltvs  
 
 
0.0335*** 0.0106***  -0.000240 
[4.59] [4.13]  [0.09] 
Growth rate  it gtvs  
=  1 it it ltvs ltvs − −  
 
0.139*** 0.0562***  0.0251** 
[4.52] [5.16]  [2.21] 
Growth rate (t-1)  1 it gtvs −  
=  12 it it ltvs ltvs −− −  
 
0.0703** 0.0244**  0.00628 
[2.25] [2.26]  [0.60] 
 
1 D : =1 for plants born 
pre 1975 
 
-0.0831*** -0.0351***  -0.0170** 
[3.02] [3.87]  [2.07] 
 
2 D : =1for plants 
affiliated w/ multi-unit 
firms 
 
0.0896** 0.0390**  0.0258* 
[1.96] [2.31]  [1.72] 
        
3-digit SIC dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Survey year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
        












Table 4 Effect of other variables 
  Effects of wage variables (plant level)  Effect of other 3-digit SIC level variables 
















 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Expected growth 
,4 eQ





ti t i t E ltvs ltvs + −  
 
-0.0566*** -0.0219*** -0.00953** -0.0454**  -0.0184*** -0.00642 
[3.70] [4.27] [2.05] [2.07] [3.56] [1.06] 
Volatility measure  i σ  
 
 
0.0631  0.0464***  0.0497***  0.000193 0.0334** 0.0605*** 




it ltvs  
 
 
0.0567*** 0.0172*** 0.00127  0.0713*** 0.0249*** 0.00492* 
[9.21] [8.42] [0.67] [6.91] [13.99]  [1.81] 
Growth rate  it gtvs  
=  1 it it ltvs ltvs − −  
 
0.1627*** 0.0637*** 0.0271*** 0.161***  0.0666*** 0.0271*** 
[6.16] [7.34] [3.18] [5.37] [7.45] [3.23] 
Growth rate (t-1)  1 it gtvs −  
=  12 it it ltvs ltvs −− −  
 
0.0372  0.0207** 0.0148*  0.0396  0.0209** 0.0142* 
[1.46] [2.45] [1.93] [1.36] [2.39] [1.74] 
1 D : =1 for plants born pre 
1975 
 
-0.0705*** -0.0310*** -0.0180*** -0.0718*** -0.0330*** -0.0182*** 
[5.74] [7.45] [5.03] [3.65] [7.88] [4.46] 
2 D : =1for plants affiliated w/ 
multi-unit firms 
 
0.0493**  0.0115 -0.00577  0.0542*  0.0125 -0.0106 
[2.14] [1.44] [0.80] [1.88] [1.56] [1.10] 
ln. straight rate wage rate for 
perm workers 
 
-0.210***  -0.0856*** -0.0398*** -0.191***  -0.0745*** -0.0249*** 
[10.51] [12.78] [6.41]  [4.93]  [11.78] [3.11] 
Supplemental labor costs per 
$1 perm wage 
 
-0.259*** -0.0994***  -0.0471** -0.265*** -0.108*** -0.0474** 
[4.37] [4.80] [2.46] [2.61] [5.20] [2.07] 
Unionization rate       
 
-0.328** -0.105***  -0.0184 
          [2.18] [5.41] [0.62] 
Job-to-job transition rate       
 
-3.53 -0.429  1.14* 
     [1.35]  [1.12]  [1.81] 
Fourth-quarter seasonal factor       
 
0.644** 0.266***  0.118* 
          [2.47] [5.33] [1.86] 
3-digit  SIC  dummies  Yes Yes Yes No  No  No 
Survey  year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  8,142 8,142 3,793 8,142 8,142 3,793 
[ ]: Robust z-statistics for Probit, t-statistics for Tobit, and robust t-statistics for OLS (errors are clustered for plants in the same three-digit 
SIC for Columns 4 and 6); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 33 
 
 
Table 5 Results with geography controls 
 
Results  
with a dummy for plants in urban areas 
Results with PMSA dummies for plants 
in urban areas 
















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Expected growth 
,4 eQ





ti t i t E ltvs ltvs + −  
-0.0669*** -0.0287*** -0.0118*** -0.0789*** -0.0301*** -0.00778 
[5.32] [6.14] [2.83] [4.92] [5.53] [1.49] 
Volatility measure  i σ  
 
 
0.0645  0.0479*** 0.0469*** 0.111**  0.0658*** 0.0498*** 




it ltvs  
 
 
0.0302*** 0.00891***  -0.00159  0.0181*** 0.00336  -0.00244 
[6.30] [4.98] [0.97] [2.90] [1.56] [1.19] 
Growth rate  it gtvs  
=  1 it it ltvs ltvs − −  
 
0.158***  0.0672*** 0.0271*** 0.179***  0.0670*** 0.0205** 
[7.37] [8.52] [3.59] [6.76] [7.47] [2.28] 
Growth rate (t-1) 
1 it gtvs −  
=  12 it it ltvs ltvs −− −  
 
0.0625*** 0.0293*** 0.0152**  0.0862*** 0.0347*** 0.0138* 
[2.97] [3.80] [2.20] [3.17] [3.94] [1.72] 
1 D : =1 for plants born 
pre 1975 
 
-0.0827*** -0.0378*** -0.0206*** -0.0737*** -0.0330*** -0.0215*** 
[8.02] [9.85] [6.31] [5.34] [6.93] [4.77] 
 
2 D : =1for plants 
affiliated w/ multi-unit 
firms 
 













D3=1 for urban plants 
 
0.0320*** 0.0199*** 0.0151***        
[2.82] [4.65] [4.42]        
             
3-digit  SIC  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey  year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PMSA  dummies  No No No Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
Observations  10,964  10,964  4,513 7,621 7,621 3,274 
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A. A More General Model 
Here, we consider the case in which the plant’s horizon is infinite and the exogenous levels 
of required outputs over time are i.i.d. random variables. The plant’s optimal policy is 
essentially identical to the solution of the first period of the two period model.
25   
The intuition is that given future optimal behavior, the choice of pτ at time τ  
determines the number of permanent workers fired at time  1 τ + . However, subsequent 
layoffs depend on the independent choice of  1 pτ + ,  2 pτ+ , etc. and not pτ .  Thus in 
considering the optimal choice of permanent employment level at τ , future firing cost 
considerations are identical to those in the first period of the two-period model.  That is, the 
marginal expected discounted firing cost associated with an increase in  pτ  is  (( ) ) Gfp τ βδ . 
Given that a plant starts with a level of permanent workers in the previous period such that 
1 p p τ − < , the marginal change in expected costs from employing an additional permanent 
worker differs only slightly from the two-period case.  This is because, if 1 p p τ τ − < , then 
increasing  pτ   reduces firing costs in the current period.
26    Thus, in the i.i.d. case, 
1 () [ ] ( () )
dTC




δβ δ − =−Δ − < + , where  1 [] I pp ττ − < , is an indicator 
function for  1 p p τ τ − < . This function has a discrete jump at 1 p p τ τ − = . However, it is still 
                                                           
25 The only qualification is that the plant must start with a level of permanent workers that is less than or 
equal to, the cap derived in the two-period model Section 2.  As long as this is the case, it is optimal to 
follow the rule that 
*1 min( ( ), ) pf y p
ττ
− = .  If this were not the case (i.e., the plant started with
1 pp
τ − > ), it 
is possible that the optimal level is such that pp
τ > .  However, once a realization of the y
τ  comes in 
below () f p , the rule 
*1 min( ( ), ) pf y p
ττ
− = becomes optimal for the rest of time. 
26 In the two-period case, we implicitly assumed that the plant started the first period with no perms.  Thus, 
we did not have to consider the effect of its decision on the number of permanent workers laid off in the 
first period. 38 
 
strictly increasing and given that 1 p p τ − < , it still is equal to zero at p p τ =  (See Appendix 
Figure 1). 










B. Our sample based on the PCU data 
In the questionnaire, plants are asked to report, for each shift, the total number of production 
workers, temporary production workers, total hours worked by production workers, hours 
worked by temporary workers, and overtime hours. We consider that a plant operates a given 
shift if it reports positive total production workers for the shift, who are defined to include 
temporary workers in the instructions for the questionnaire given to the plant. Among plants 
operating a particular shift, however, many left the information for temporary production 
workers unfilled, and often, such plants do not provide a temporary worker number for any 

















u δ −Δ −  
1 pτ −  39 
 
fill out the item. We consider that they did not fill out the item, since the instructions for the 
PCU survey explicitly instructs them both in words and with visual examples of the tables to 
write zero when plants operate a given shift but do not use temporary workers. We exclude 
such plants with missing temporary employment data for any of their active shifts (i.e., shifts 
for which the plant reports positive total number of production workers).  
In addition, by the definition given in the instructions, when a given shift exists, the 
total number of production workers should be greater than or equal to the number of 
temporary workers. We exclude plants with any inconsistency regarding these figures. We 
also exclude a few plants reporting the same number for both total and temporary workers for 
some shifts. It is possible that these shifts are actually supported by only temporary workers. 
However, such incidents are rare and we cannot tell whether these are miss data entry.  
  Once we clean the PCU data, we limit the sample to those for which we can estimate 
our key variables based on the ASM and the CM as discussed in the main text. Based on the 
method discussed in Section 3, for a plant to be included in estimation, the plant has to 
appear in consecutive three years more than once in ASM-CM panel. We limit our sample to 
plants that appear in three years consecutively at least three times to avoid outliers. Some 










Appendix Table 1  
Analyses with the control of a contemporaneous shock 
 Probit  (dF/dX)  Tobit  OLS 
Dependent Variable 
 
D=1for plants w/ 
temps  Temp Share  Temp Share 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Expected growth 
,4 eQ





ti t i t E ltvs ltvs + −  
-0.0572*** -0.0245*** -0.00989** 
[4.61] [5.26] [2.39] 






ti t i t E ltvs ltvs − −  
0.0924*** 0.0408*** 0.0176** 
[3.99] [4.71] [2.10] 
      
 
Volatility measure  i σ  
0.0578 0.0475***  0.0496*** 
[1.34] [3.02] [3.56] 




it ltvs  
0.0347*** 0.0109*** -0.000910 
[7.31] [6.12] [0.56] 
      
Growth rate (t-1)  1 it gtvs −  
=  12 it it ltvs ltvs −− −  
0.0392* 0.0196**  0.0116* 
[1.89] [2.57] [1.69] 
      
1 D : =1 for plants born 
pre 1975 
-0.0849*** -0.0388*** -0.0209*** 
[8.25] [10.10]  [6.41] 
      
2 D : =1for plants 
affiliated w/ multi-unit 
firms 
0.0278 0.00351  -0.0136** 
[1.48] [0.49] [2.17] 
        
3-digit SIC dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Survey year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
      
N. of observations  10,964  10,964  4,513 
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